Abstract. We introduce the notion of distributed password-based public-key cryptography, where a virtual high-entropy private key is implicitly dened as a concatenation of low-entropy passwords held in separate locations. The users can jointly perform private-key operations by exchanging messages over an arbitrary channel, based on their respective passwords, without ever sharing their passwords or reconstituting the key.
Introduction
Traditional wisdom says that it is impossible to do public-key cryptography from short passwords. This is because any low-entropy private key will quickly succumb to an o-line dictionary attack, made possible by the very publication of the public key, which can thus be used as a non-interactive test function. Since o-line attacks are very eective against weak secrets, it is imperative that the private keys in public-key systems be highly random and complex, but that makes them hopelessly impossible to be remembered by humans.
But, what if, instead of being held as an indivisible entity, the private key were chopped into many little pieces, each one of them independently memorized by a dierent person in a group of friends or colleagues?
The components of the key would be safe in the respective memories of the individual group members, at least as long as it is not used. The only complication is the need to reassemble the full private key from the various components, so that private-key operations can be performed. Naturally, the secret holders should not actually reassemble the key, but instead perform a distributed computation of whichever private-key operation they need, without ever having to meet or even reconstitute the key.
Unusual Requirements.
Even if one can perform private-key computations without reassembling the key, there are other, more subtle vulnerabilities.
For starters, we cannot simply assume that the (virtual) private key is simply made of some number of random components (one per user) generated independently and uniformly at random. On the contrary, we must assume that the various components are arbitrary and possibly correlated, and some of them potentially very weak and easily guessable. This is because of our requirement of human-memorability:
for the components to be truly memorable, it is imperative that their respective owners choose them in whichever way they please.
A consequence of the above is that it also opens the possibility of password reuse by the various users:
although this is a bad security practice that should be discouraged, it is also one that is very common and that we should acknowledge and handle the best way we can, rather than pretend that it will not happen.
Additionally, since the various secret holders do not necessarily trust each other, it is necessary that Multi-Party Computation.
The rst and most famous MPC protocol is due to Yao [31] . Depending on the setup, such protocols allow two participants with secret inputs to compute a public function of their joint inputs, without leaking anything other than the output of the function [25, 24, 6, 16] . MPC protocols typically assume all communications between the players to be authentic: that is, an external mechanism precludes modications or fake message insertions. The ip side is that such protocols tend to become insecure when the number of dishonest players reaches a certain threshold that allows them to take over the computation and from there recover the other players' inputs [29, 2, 26] .
Several works have dealt with the case of MPC over unauthenticated channels [13, 20, 1] , by prefacing the multi-party computation proper with some avor of authentication based on non-malleable commitments or signatures [18] . The work of Barak et al. [1] in particular gives general conditions of what can
and cannot be achieved in unauthenticated multi-party computations: they show that an adversary is always able to partition the set of players into disjoint islands that end up performing independent computations, but nothing else besides dropping messages and/or relaying them faithfully. They show how to transform any (realization of an) UC functionality into a multi-party version of the same that merely lets the adversary split the players into disjoint islands. They also show how to build password-based group key agreement (GPAKE) from this notion, rst by creating a random session key for the group by running an MPC protocol without authentication, and then by verifying that all players have the same key using a string equality functionality. (By comparison, here, we force the users to commit to their passwords rst, and then perform the actual computation based on those commitments.)
Although it is clear that, like so many other things in cryptography, our work can be viewed as a special case of unauthenticated MPC, our contribution lies not in this obvious conceptual step, but in the specication of suitable functionalities for the non-trivial problem of password-based threshold cryptography (and their ecient implementation). In particular, much grief arises from our requirement that each user has its own password (which may even be reused in other contexts), instead of a single common password for the whole group as in the applications considered in [1] and elsewhere.
On-line Passwords.
The rst insight that weak passwords could be used on-line (in a key exchange protocol) with relative impunity was made in [5] . It captured the idea that the success of an adversary in breaking the protocol should be proportional to the number of times this adversary interacts with the server, and only negligibly in its o-line computing capabilities.
In the password-only scenario (without public-key infrastructure), the rst protocols with a proof of security appeared contemporaneously in [11] and [3] , both in the random-oracle model. A (somewhat inecient) protocol without any setup assumption was rst proposed in [23] . A fairly ecient one in the common random string model was rst given in [27] and generalized in [22] .
To cope with concurrent sessions, the work of [14] was the rst to propose an ideal functionality for PAKE in the UC model, as well as a protocol that securely realizes it. Unlike previous models, one of the major advantages of the UC one is that it makes no assumption on the distribution of the passwords; it also considers, for instance, some realistic scenarios such as participants running the protocol with dierent but possibly related passwords.
Security Model
The UC Framework.
Throughout this paper, we assume basic familiarity with the universal composability (UC) framework [12] . See Appendix A for a short introduction of some UC notions we shall use in this work.
Split Functionalities.
Without any strong authentication mechanisms, the adversary A can always partition the players into disjoint subgroups and execute independent sessions of the protocol with each one, playing the role of the other players. Such an attack is unavoidable since players cannot distinguish the case in which they interact with each other from the case where they interact with A. The authors of [1] addressed this issue by proposing a new model based on split functionalities which guarantees that this attack is the only one available to A.
The split functionality is a generic construction based upon an ideal functionality: Its description can be found on Figure 1 . In the initialization stage, the adversary A adaptively chooses disjoint subsets of the honest parties (with a unique session identier that is xed for the duration of the protocol). During the computation, each subset H activates a separate instance of the functionality F. All these functionality instances are independent: The executions of the protocol for each subset H can only be related in the way A chooses the inputs of the players it controls. The parties P i ∈ H provide their own inputs and receive their own outputs, whereas A plays the role of all the parties P j / ∈ H.
Given a functionality F, the split functionality sF proceeds as follows:
Initialization In the sequel, as we describe our two general functionalities F pwDistPublicKeyGen and F pwDistPrivateComp , one has to keep in mind that an attacker controlling the communication channels can always choose to view them as the split functionalities sF pwDistPublicKeyGen and sF pwDistPrivateComp implicitly consisting of multiple instances of F pwDistPublicKeyGen and F pwDistPrivateComp for non-overlapping subsets of the original players. Furthermore, one cannot prevent A from keeping some ows, which will never arrive. This is modelled in our functionalities (Figures 2 and 3 ) by a bit b, which species whether the ow is really sent or not.
The Ideal Functionalities.
In the sequel we denote by n the number of users involved in a given execution of the protocol. One of the users plays a particular role and is denoted as the group leader, the others are simply denoted as players. Groups can be formed arbitrarily. Each group is dened by its leader (who owns the group by being the one to receive the result of any private computation) and an arbitrary number of other players in a specic order (who assist and authorize the leader in his or her use of the group's virtual key).
We stress that the composition and ordering of a group is what denes it and cannot be changed: this ensures that any third-party who uses the group's public key knows exactly how the corresponding private key will be accessed. If another player wants to be the leader, he or she will have to form a new group.
(Even though such new group may contain the same set of members with possibly unchanged passwords, the two groups will be distinct and have dierent incompatible key pairs because of the dierent ordering).
As in [14] , the functionality is not in charge of providing the passwords to the participants. The passwords are chosen by the environment which then hands them to the parties as inputs. This guarantees security even in the case where a honest user executes the protocol with an incorrect password: This models, for instance, the case where a user mistypes its password. It also implies that the security is preserved for all password distributions (not necessarily the uniform one) and in all situations where related passwords are used in dierent protocols.
Since the functionalities are intended to capture distributed password protocols for (the key generation and private-key operation of ) an arbitrary public-key primitive, we will represent all the primitive's algorithms as black box parameters in our denitions. In general, we shall require: a function SecretKeyGen to combine a vector of passwords into a single secret key; a function PublicKeyGen to compute from a password vector a matching public key; a predicate PublicKeyVer to verify such public key against any password vector: this is important for the correctness of the ideal functionalities, but it also simplies the use of the joint-state UC Theorem since it abstracts away the passwords that then do not need to be considered as part of the joint data; a function PrivateComp to perform the operation of interest using the private key: this could be the decryption function Dec of a public-key encryption scheme, the signing function Sign in a signature scheme, or the identity-based key extraction function Extract in an IBE system. Both functionalities start with an initialization step, which basically waits for all the users to notify their interest in computing a public key or performing a private computation, as the case may be. Such notication is provided via newSession queries (containing the session identier sid of the instance of the protocol, the user's identity P i , the identity of the group P id, the user's password pw i , and when computing the private function, a public key pk and input in) sent by the players or by the simulator S in case of corruptions during the rst ow (corresponding to the split functionality). Once all the users (sharing the same sid and P id) have sent their notication message, the functionality informs the adversary that it is ready to proceed.
In principle, after the initialization stage is over, the eligible users are ready to receive the result.
However the functionality waits for S to send a compute message before proceeding. This allows S to decide the exact moment when the key should be sent to the users and, in particular, it allows S to choose the exact moment when corruptions should occur (for instance S may decide to corrupt some party P i before the key is sent but after P i decided to participate to a given session of the protocol; see [28] ). Also, although in the key generation functionality all users are normally eligible to receive the public key, in the private computation functionality it is important that only the group leader receives the output (though he may choose to reveal it afterwards to others, outside of the protocol, depending on the application).
The Distributed Key Generation Functionality (Figure 2 ).
The aim of this functionality is to provide a public key to the users, computed according to their passwords with respect to the previously mentioned function PublicKeyGen given in parameter, and it ensures that the group leader never receives an incorrect key in the end, whatever does the adversary. The protocol starts with an initialization phase as already described, followed by a key computation phase triggered by an explicit key computation query (so that S can control its timing.)
The functionality F pwDistPublicKeyGen is parametrized by a security parameter k and an eciently computable function PublicKeyGen : (pw 1 , pw 2 , . . . , pw n ) → pk that derives a public key pk from a set of passwords. Denote by role either player or leader. The functionality interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1,. . . ,Pn via the following queries:
Initialization. Upon receiving a query (newSession, sid, P id, Pi, pw i , role) from user Pi for the rst time, where P id is a set of at least two distinct identities containing Pi, ignore it if role = leader and if there is already a record of the form (sid, P id, * , * , leader). Record (sid, P id, Pi, pw i , role) and send (sid, P id, Pi, role) to S. Ignore any subsequent query (newSession, sid, P id , * , * , * ) where P id = P id.
If there are already |P id| − 1 recorded tuples (sid, P id, Pj, pw j ) for Pj ∈ P id \ {Pi}, and exactly one of them such that role = leader, then while recording the |P id|-th tuple, also record (sid, P id, ready) and send this to S. Otherwise, record (sid, P id, error) and send (sid, P id, error) to S.
Key Computation. Upon receiving a message (compute, sid, P id) from the adversary S where there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, ready), then compute pk = PublicKeyGen(pw 1 , . . . , pw n ) and record (sid, P id, pk). Leader Key Delivery. Upon receiving a message (leaderDeliver, sid, P id, b) from the adversary S for the rst time, where there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, pk) and a record (sid, P id, Pi, pwi, leader), send (sid, P id, pk) to Pi and to S if b = 1, or (sid, P id, error) otherwise. Record (sid, P id, sent) and send this to S. Player Key Delivery. Upon receiving (playerDeliver, sid, P id, b, Pi) from the adversary S where there are recorded tuples (sid, P id, pk), (sid, P id, Pi, pwi, player) and (sid, P id, sent), send (sid, P id, pk) to Pi if b = 1, or (sid, P id, error) otherwise. User Corruption. If S corrupts Pi ∈ P id where there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, Pi, pw i ), then reveal pw i to S. If there also is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, pk) and if (sid, P id, pk) has not yet been sent to Pi, send (sid, P id, pk) to S.
Fig. 2. The Distributed Key Generation Functionality FpwDistPublicKeyGen
After the key is computed, the adversary can choose whether the group leader indeed receives this key. If delivery is denied, then nobody gets the key, and it is as if it was never computed. If delivery is allowed, then the group leader and S both receive the public key. This behavior captures the fact that the generated public key is intended to be available to all, starting with the opponent. (More to the point, this requirement will also weed out some bogus protocols that could only be secure if the public key remained unavailable to S.) Once they have received the public key, the other players may be allowed to receive it too, according to a schedule chosen by S, and modeled by means of key delivery queries from S. Once S asks to deliver the key to a player, the key is sent immediately.
Note that given the public key, if the adversary knows suciently many passwords that the combined entropy of the remaining passwords is low enough, he will be able to recover these remaining passwords by brute force attack. This is unavoidable and explains the absence of any testPwd query in this functionality.
(This has nothing to do with the fact that our system is distributed: o-line attacks are always possible in principle in public-key systems, and become feasible as soon as a sucient portion of the private key becomes known.)
The Distributed Private Computation Functionality (Figure 3 ).
The aim here is to perform a private computation for the sole benet of the group leader. The leader is responsible for the correctness of the computation; in addition, it is the only user to receive the end result. This functionality will thus compute a function of some supplied input in, depending on a set of passwords that must dene a secret key corresponding to a given public key. More precisely, the functionality will be able to check the compatibility of the passwords with the public key thanks to the verication function PublicKeyVer, and if it is correct it will then compute the secret key sk with the help of the function SecretKeyGen, and from there evaluate PrivateComp(sk, in) and give the result to the leader. Note that SecretKeyGen and PublicKeyVer are naturally related to the function PublicKeyGen called by the former functionality. In all generality, unless SecretKeyGen and PublicKeyGen are both assumed to be deterministic, we need the predicate PublicKeyVer in order to verify that a public key is correct without necessarily being equal (to some canonical public key). Also note that the function SecretKeyGen is not assumed to be injective, lest it unduly restrict the number of users and the total size of their passwords. Initialization. Upon receiving a query (newSession, sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pw i , role) from user Pi for the rst time, where P id is a set of at least two distinct identities containing Pi, ignore it if role = leader and if there is already a record of the form (sid, P id, * , * , * , * , leader). Record (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pw i , role), mark it fresh, and send (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, role) to S.
Ignore any subsequent query (newSession, sid, P id , * , * , * , * , * ) where P id = P id.
If there are already |P id| − 1 recorded tuples (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pw i , role), and exactly one of them such that role = leader, then after recording the |P id|-th tuple, verify that the values of c and pk are the same for all the users. If the tuples do not fulll all of these conditions, report (sid, P id, error) to S and stop. Otherwise, record (sid, P id, pk, c, ready) and send it to S. The group leader is Pj.
Password Test. Upon receiving a rst query (testPwd, sid, P id, {Pi 1 , . . . , Pi l }, {pw i 1 , . . . , pw i l }) from S, if there exist l records (sid, P id, Pi k , pk, c, * , * ), necessarily still marked fresh, and a record (sid, P id, pk, c, ready), then denote by pw j l+1 , . . . , pw jn the passwords of the other users of the group. If PublicKeyVer(pw 1 , . . . , pw n , pk) = 1, edit the records of Pi 1 , . . . , Pi l to be marked compromised and reply to S with correct guess. Otherwise, mark the records of the users Pi 1 , . . . , Pi l as interrupted and reply to S with wrong guess. Ignore all subsequent queries of the form (testPwd, sid, P id, * , * ).
Private Computation. Upon receiving a message (compute, sid, P id) from S where there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, pk, c, ready), then, if all records are fresh or compromised and PublicKeyVer(pw 1 , . . . , pw n , pk) = 1, then compute sk = SecretKeyGen(pw 1 , . . . , pw n ) and m = PrivateComp(sk, c), and store (sid, P id, m); Next, for all Pi ∈ P id mark the record (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pw i , role) as complete. In any other case, store (sid, P id, error). When the computation result is set, report the outcome (either error or complete) to S. Leader Computation Delivery. Upon receiving (leaderDeliver, sid, P id, b) from S, where there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, m) such that m ∈ {well-formed messages} ∪ {error}, and there exists a record (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pw i , leader), send (sid, P id, m) to Pi if b is equal to 1, or send (sid, P id, error) if b is equal to 0. If the group leader Pi is corrupted or compromised, then send (sid, P id, m) to S as well (note that S gets m automatically if Pj is corrupted). User Corruption. If S corrupts Pi ∈ P id where there is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, Pi, pk, c, pw i , role), then reveal pw i to S. If role = leader, if there also is a recorded tuple (sid, P id, m), and if (sid, P id, m) has not yet been sent to Pi, then also send (sid, P id, m) to S. During the initialization phase, each user is given as input a password pw i as outlined earlier, but also an input in, and a public key pk. We stress that the security is guaranteed even if the users do not share the same values for in and pk, because then the functionality fails directly at the end of the initialization phase. At the end of this step, the adversary is also given knowledge of the common in and pk (as these are supposedly public).
After this initialization step is over, but before the actual computation, the adversary S is given the opportunity to make one or more simultaneous password guesses, by issuing a single Password Test query, to model a man-in-the-middle impersonation attack against a subset of users. The query must indicate the subset of user(s) targeted in the attack, and what password(s) S wishes to test for those user(s). If all passwords are compatible with pk, the aected users are marked as compromised, otherwise they are all marked as interrupted. Unaected users remain marked as fresh. Observe that it is in the opponent's best interest to target only a single user in the Password Test query to optimize compromising probability.
Once the functionality receives a message of the form (compute, sid, P id) from S, it proceeds to the computation phase. This is done as follows. If (1) all records are fresh or compromised, and (2) the passwords are compatible with the common public key pk, then the functionality computes the private key sk and then the output out. In all other cases, no message is computed.
In any case, after the key generation, the functionality informs the adversary of the result, meaning that S is told whether a message was actually computed or not. In particular, this means that the adversary also learns whether the users' passwords are compatible with pk or not. At rst glance this may seem like a critical information to provide to the adversary. We argue, however, that this is not the case in our setting.
Firstly, learning the status of the protocol (that is, whether it succeeded) without having any knowledge of the passwords that went into it is completely pointless, and the only knowledge that the adversary may have about those passwords are the ones it used in the testPwd impersonation query. Hence, as one should expect, from the status of the protocol the only useful thing that the adversary can learn is whether the password guesses it made were all good or not (as a single yes/no answer), but nothing else. Secondly, even if the adversary could somehow derive more utility from the protocol status, modeling that status as secret is not sensible because in most real-world scenarios it will be easy to infer from the users' behavior.
At the end, and similarly to the rst functionality, the nal result can either be released to the group leader, or withheld from it. However, this time, since the nal result is a private output, there is no provision to distribute it to the other players. Also, S only gets the message if the leader either has been previously corrupted or if it is in the compromised state (either the leader has fallen under S's control, or S has successfully taken its place in the protocol).
Discussion.
We emphasize that in this model only the leader and no other player receives the nal result. Although this has the advantage of making the construction simpler, it is also the most useful and the only sensible choice. For starters, this makes our protocol much more resilient to password breaks in on-line impersonation attacks. To see why, suppose that the nal output were indeed sent to all users.
Then cracking the password of a single user would be all it took to break the system: adding more users would actually decrease the overall on-line security, because with a larger group comes a greater chance that some user will choose a weak password. By contrast, in the actual model, breaking the password of an ordinary user has no dire consequence: the protocol security will simply continue to rest on the passwords that remain. Since compromising ordinary users brings no other direct reward than to expose their passwords, it is just as if broken passwords were removed from the key in future protocol executions, or never contributed to it in the rst place.
Of course, cracking the password of the leader will compromise the group and grant access to private computations (with the help of the other players, still), but that is only natural since the leader owns the group. There is an important distinction between exposure of an ordinary player's password and the leader's password: the leader represents the group with respect to third parties, i.e., when third parties use the group's public key their intention is to communicate with the leader. By contrast, ordinary players are not meant to be trusted and their inclusion to the group is a choice by the leader to help him or her increase the security of the private key or leave it unchanged if that player turns out to be compromised but never decrease it.
Revocation.
In case of compromise of the leader password, it is possible for the leader to revoke the group by instructing the other players to stop participating in that group (e.g., by using the group's resources one last time to sign a revocation certicate using the group's private key). This will prevent any further use of the group's resources, unless of course the adversary manages to crack all of the players' passwords jointly. Such revocation mechanism falls outside of the protocol, so we do not model it in the functionalities.
User Corruptions. Our denition of the F pwDistPrivateComp functionality deals with user corruptions in a way that is quite dierent to that of other password-based group protocols. E.g., in the group key exchange functionality of [28] , if the adversary has obtained the passwords of some participants (via password guesses or user corruptions), it may freely set the resulting session key to any value. Here, our functionalities are much more demanding in two important ways: rst, S is much constrained in the way it can make and test online password guesses; second, S can never alter the computation in any way once it has started.
Password Tests.
The rst dierence is that the testPwd query can only be asked once, early in the protocol, and it does not actually test the password of the users, but rather the compatibility between
(1) the guessed passwords of any specied subset of users, (2) the real passwords of the rest of the group (known by the functionality thanks to the newSession queries), and (3) the public key (which at this stage is already guaranteed to be the same in all the users' views). This unusual shape for the testPwd query provides a very high level of security, because (A) at most a single set of password guesses can be tested against any player in any protocol instance, and (B) if S chooses to test a set of more than one password at once, then to cause a positive response all the guesses must be correct simultaneously (and since this becomes exponentially unlikely, the astute adversary should be content to test sets of one password at a time). After the private computation, all the records, initially fresh, compromised, or interrupted, become either complete or error. No more testPwd query is accepted at this stage, because once the users have completed their task it is too late for S to impersonate them (though corruption queries can still be made to read their state). Note that one testPwd query is allowed for each instance of F pwDistPrivateComp , several of which may be invoked by the split functionality sF pwDistPrivateComp .
Robustness.
The second dierence with the model in [28] is that we do not grant the adversary the right to alter the computation result when corrupting some users or learning some passwords. This in particular means that either the group leader receives something coherent, or he receives an error; he cannot receive something wrong, which makes the protocol robust. Robustness is actually automatic if we make the assumption that the computation function PrivateComp is deterministic; for simplicity, this is the setting of the generic protocol described in detail in this paper. At the end, however, we shall mention some applications that require randomness in the computation. Without going into details, we can keep the protocol robust by having all the parties commit to their random coins in the rst round, in the same way as they will also commit to their passwords (see below): this allows us to treat such coins as any regular private input in the model, and hence forbid the adversary from modifying them once the computation has started.
We remark that, although the adversary cannot spoof the computation, the environment does become aware of the completion of the protocol, and hence could distinguish between the ideal and the real worlds if the adversary won more often in one than the other. Such environmental awareness of the nal state is of course to be expected in reality, and so it is natural that our model should capture it. (Our implementation will thus have to ensure that the success conditions are the same in both worlds.)
Implicit Corruptions.
Because we have a set of initially unauthenticated players communicating over adversarially controlled channels, it is always possible for the adversary to partition the actual players into isolated islands [1] , and act on behalf of the complement of players with respect to each island. We call this an implicit corruption, meaning that the adversary usurps the identity of a regular player (or players) from the very start, before the key generation is even initiated. The adversary then sends the newSession query on behalf of such implicitly corrupted players, who never really became corrupted but always were the adversary. As mentioned previously, this situation is modeled in the ideal world by the respective split functionalities sF pwDistPublicKeyGen and sF pwDistPrivateComp spawning one or more instances of the normal functionalities F pwDistPublicKeyGen and F pwDistPrivateComp over disjoint sets of (actual) players, as illustrated on Figure 1 .
Protocol Description
The following protocol deals with a particular case of unauthenticated distributed private computation [1] , as captured by our functionalities. Informally, assuming s to be a secret key, the aim of the protocol is to compute a value c s given an element c of the group. This computation can be used to perform distributed BLS signatures [10] , ElGamal decryptions [19] , linear decryptions [8] , and BF or BB1 identity-based key extraction [9, 7] .
Here we focus on ElGamal decryptions, relying on the DDH assumption. We emphasize that the protocol as given relies exclusively on DDH, not requiring any additional assumption; and that it can be easily modied to rely on the Decision Linear assumption for compatibility with bilinear groups [8] .
Building Blocks.
Let G be a group of prime order p, and g a generator of this group. We furthermore assume to be given an element h in G as a CRS. We use the following building blocks:
Password Selection.
Each user P i owns a privately selected password pw i , to act as the i-th share of the secret key sk (see below). For convenience, we write pw i = pw i,1 . .
we further divide each password pw i into
The segmentation into blocks is a technicality to get ecient extractable commitments for long passwords:
in the concrete scheme, for example, we shall use single-bit blocks in order to achieve the most ecient extraction (i.e, L = 1 and = 160 for a 160-bit prime p). Notice that although we allow full-size passwords of up to L bits (the size of p), users are of course permitted to choose shorter passwords.
Password Combination. The private key sk is dened as the (virtual) combination of all the passwords pw i . It does not matter how precisely such combination is done, as long as it is reproducible and preserves the joint entropy of the set of passwords (up to log 2 p bits, since that is the length of sk). For example, if there are n users, all with short passwords pw * i ∈ {0, . . . , ∆ − 1} with ∆ n < p, dening pw i = ∆ i pw * i and taking sk = i pw i will ensure that there are no aliasing eects, or mutual cancellation of two or more passwords.
In general, it is preferable that each user independently transforms his or her true password pw * i into an eective password pw i by applying a suitable extractor pw i = H(i, pw * i , Z i ) where Z i is any relevant public information such as a description of the group and its purpose. We can then safely take sk = i pw i and be assured that the entropy of sk will closely match the joint entropy of the vector (pw * 1 , . . . , pw * n )
taken together. Such password pre-processing using hashing is very standard but falls outside of the functionalities proper.
Public and Private Keys.
We use the (eective) passwords pw i to dene a key pair (sk, pk = g sk )
for a password-based ElGamal key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Based on the above, we dene
public-key verication function is then PublicKeyVer(pw 1 , . . . , pw n , pk)
The ElGamal KEM public-key operation is the encapsulation Enc : (pk, r) → (c = g r , m = pk r ), which outputs a random session key m and a ciphertext c. The private-key operation is the decapsulation Dec : (sk, c) → m = c sk , which here is deterministic. Observe that whereas Dec instantiates PrivateComp in the functionalities, Enc is intended for public third-party usage and never appears in the private protocols.
Entropy Preservation.
In order for the low password entropies to combine nicely in the secret key sk = i pw i , the eective pw i must be properly decoupled to avoid mutual cancellations, as just discussed.
We note that, even with the kind of shuing previously considered, it is quite possible that the actual entropy of sk will be smaller than its maximum value of log 2 p bits, e.g., if there are not enough noncorrupted users or if their passwords are too small. Nevertheless, there is no known eective attack against discrete logarithm and related problems that can take advantage of any reduced entropy of sk, barring an exhaustive search over the space of possible values. Specically, regardless of how the passwords are actually combined, one could easily prove that no generic attack [30] can solve the discrete logarithm or the DDH problem in less than √ 2 h operations, where h is the min-entropy of the private key sk conditionally on all known passwords.
Computational Assumption.
Our concrete protocols rely on the Decisional Die-Hellman (DDH) assumption, stated here for completeness: Let G = g be a multiplicative abelian cyclic group of prime order p. For random x, y, z ∈ Z * p , it is computationally intractable to distinguish (g, g x , g y , g xy ) from (g, g x , g y , g z ).
Extractable Homomorphic Commitments.
The rst step of our distributed decryption protocol is for each user to commit to his password (the details are given in the following section). The commitment needs to be extractable, homomorphic, and compatible with the shape of the public key. Generally speaking, one needs a commitment Commit(pw, r) that is additively homomorphic on pw and with certain properties on r. In order to simplify the following description of the protocols, we chose to use ElGamal's scheme [19] , which is additive on the random value r, and given by: Commit v (pw, r) = (v pw h r , g r ). The semantic security relies on the above DDH assumption. Extractability is possible granted the decryption key x, such that h = g x in the common reference string.
Simulation-Sound Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs.
Informally speaking, a zeroknowledge proof system is said to be simulation-sound if it has the property that an adversary cannot give a convincing proof for a false statement, even if it has oracle access to the zero-knowledge simulator. We also require non-malleability, which is to say that a proof of some theorem cannot be turned into a proof of another theorem. De Santis et al. proved in [17] the existence of such a scheme, with the additional property of being non-interactive, if we assume the existence of one-way trapdoor permutations. Note that their scheme allows for multiple simulations with a unique common random string (CRS), which is crucial for the multi-session case. If we instantiate all the SSNIZK proofs with those, then our protocols are UC-secure in the CRS model.
However, for sake of eciency, we can instead instantiate them using Schnorr-like proofs of equality of discrete logarithms [21] , which rely on the random-oracle model [4] , but are signicantly more practical.
These SSNIZK are well-known (see details in Appendix C and their proofs in [21] ), but along these lines, we use the notation SSNIZK(L(w)) for a proof that w lies in the language L. More precisely, CDH(g, G, h, H) will state that (g, G, h, H) lies in the CDH language: there exists a common exponent x such that G = g x and H = h x .
Intuition.
We rst describe the distributed decryption algorithm. All the users are provided with a password pw i , a public key pk, and a ciphertext c. One of them is the leader of the group, denoted by P 1 , and the others are P 2 , . . . , P n . For this given ciphertext c ∈ G, the leader wants to obtain m = c sk . But before computing this value, everybody wants to be sure that all the users are honest, or at least that the combination of the passwords is compatible with the public key.
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n , hi)) The protocol starts by verifying that they will be able to decrypt the ciphertext, and thus that they indeed know a representation of the decryption key into shares. Each user sends a commitment C i of his password. As we see in the proof (see Appendix B), this commitment needs to be extractable so that the simulator is able to recover the passwords used by the adversary: this is a requirement of the UC model, as in [14] . Indeed, the simulator needs to be able to simulate everything without knowing any passwords, he thus recovers the passwords by extracting them from the commitments C i made by the adversary in this rst round, enabling him to adjust his own values before the subsequent commitments, so that all the passwords are compatible with the public key (if they should be in the situation at hand). If we think in terms of ElGamal encryption, the extraction is proportional in the square root of the size of the alphabet, which would be practical for 20-bit passwords but not 160-bit ones (and even if passwords are usually small, we do not want to restrict the size of the passwords). This is the reason why we segmented all the passwords into small blocks: to commit to them block by block. In our concrete description, blocks are of size 1, which will help to make the proof of validity: ElGamal encryption of one bit.
Once this rst step is done, the users commit again to their passwords. The new commitments C i will be the ones used in the rest of the protocol. They need not be segmented (since we will not extract anything from them), but we ask the users to prove that they are compatible with the former ones. Note that they use the three values H = H(C 1 , . . . , C n ) (where H is a collision-resistant hash function), pk, and c, as labels of these commitments (see below), to avoid malleability and replay from the previous sessions, granted the SSNIZK proofs that include and thus check these labels.
Next, the users make yet another commitment A i to their passwords, but this time they do an ElGamal encryption of pw i in base c instead of in base g (in the above C i commitment). That is, each user computes A i = (c pw i h t i , g t i ). The commitment C i will be used to check the possibility of the decryption (that it is consistent with pk = g sk ), whereas A i will be used to actually compute the decryption c sk , hence the two dierent bases g and c in C i and A i , respectively.
All the users send these last two commitments to everybody, along with a SSNIZK proof that the same password was used each time. These proofs are labeled by H, pk, and c, and the verication by the other users will succeed only if their labels are identical. This enables all the players to check that everybody shares the same public key pk and the same ciphertext c. It thus avoids situations in which a group leader with an incorrect key obtains a correct decryption message, contrary to the ideal functionality.
The protocol will thus fail if H, pk, or c is not the same to everyone, which is the result required by the ideal functionality. Note that the protocol will also fail if the adversary drops or modies a ow received by a user, even if everything was correct (compatible passwords, same public key, same ciphertext). This situation is modeled in the functionality by the bit b of the key/decryption delivery queries, for when everything goes well but the group leader does not obtain the result.
After these rounds of commitments, a verication step allows for the group leader, but also all the players, to check whether the public key and the passwords are compatible. Note that at this point, everything has become publicly veriable so that the group leader will not be able to cheat and make the other players believe that everything is correct when it is not. Verication starts from the commitments
, and involves two blinding rings to raise the two values i C i
(1) and
The ratio of the blinded values is taken to cancel the h
leaving g αsk . A nal unblinding ring is applied to remove the exponent α and expose g sk . This ends with a decision by the group leader on whether to abort the protocol (when the passwords are incompatible with the public key) or go on to the computation step. We stress that every user is able to check the validity of the group leader's decision: A dishonest execution cannot continue without an honest user becoming aware of it (and aborting it). Note however that an honest execution can also be stopped by a user if the adversary modies a ow destined to it, as reected by the bit b in the ideal functionality.
If the group leader decides to go on, the players assist in the computation of c sk , again with the help of two blinding and one unblinding rings, starting from the commitments A i . Note that if at some point a user fails to send its value to everyone (for instance due to a denial of service attack) or if the adversary modies a ow (in a man-in-the-middle attack), the protocol will fail. In the ideal world this means that the simulator makes a decryption delivery with a bit b set to zero. Because of the SSNIZK proofs, in these decryption rounds exactly the same sequence of passwords as in the rst rounds has to be used by the players. This necessarily implies compatibility with the public key, but may be a stronger condition.
As a side note, observe that all the blinding rings in the verication and the computation steps could be made concurrent instead of sequential, in order to simplify the protocol. Notice however that the nal unblinding ring of c sk in the computation step should only be carried out after the public key and the committed passwords are known to be compatible, and the passwords to be the same in both sequences of commitments, i.e. after the verication step succeeded.
We show in Appendix B that we can eciently simulate these computations without the knowledge of the pw i 's, so that they do not reveal anything more about the pw i 's than pk already does. More precisely,
we show that such computations are indistinguishable to A under the DDH assumption. The key generation protocol (computation of pk = g sk ) is a special case of the decryption protocol outlined above (computation of g sk , test that g sk = pk, computation of m = c sk ), only simpler. Indeed, we only need one set of commitments for the last rounds of blinding/unblinding, as we omit all the prior verications (since there is nothing to verify when the key is rst set up).
We now describe more precisely both protocols (see Figures 4 and 5) .
Details of the Distributed Key Generation realizing F pwDistPublicKeyGen (Figure 4 ).
• First Step of Commitment (1a).
Each user P i commits to its share pw i (divided into blocks pw 1,1 , . . . , pw i, of length L in our description, L = 1) of the secret key sk: it computes C i,j = (C
i , δ
i ))
i ,Π
n , h i ))
n , h j )) = (g pw i,j h r i,j , g r i,j ), for j = 1, . . . , , and publishes (i.e., tries to send to everybody) C i = (C i,1 , . . . , C i, ),
with SSNIZK proofs that each commitment indeed commits to an L-bit block.
• Second
Step of Commitment (1b). Each user P i computes H = H(C 1 , . . . , C n ), and commits again to its share pw i , but this time in a single block and with label H:
, an publishes it along with a SSNIZK proof that the passwords committed are the same in the two commitments. The language considered for this proof of membership is
Notice that this denition of L implies equality of passwords between the commitments; the passwords are present inside of the C
i,j and C i (1) . See Figure 4 , Step (1b) for the realization of these SSNIZK proofs.
• First
Step of Computation (1c).
If one of the proofs received by a user is incorrect, it aborts the game. Otherwise, they share the same H and C i : they are thus able to compute the same γ 0 = (g
0 ) by multiplying the rst parts of the commitments C i to each other.
The group leader P 1 wants to compute g P pw i = pk. For i = 1, . . . , n, sequentially, P i chooses a random α i ∈ Z n and computes γ i = γ
i ). It then produces a SSNIZK proof that it used the same α i in the computations of both γ (1) i and γ (2) i , from γ (1) i−1 and γ (2) i−1 respectively, and publishes γ i along with such proof, whose language is the following equality of discrete logarithms see Figure 4 , Step (1c)
If the proof is not valid, the next user aborts. If all goes well, at the end the users will have performed a round of blinding where each user P i contributed its own random ephemeral exponent α i .
• Second Step of Computation (1d).
Denote α i by α. When the users receive the last element γ n = (g α P pw i h α P s i , h α ), they all compute and publish the value h i = h αs i , along with a SSNIZK proof that their random value s i is the same as the one they used in C i (as before, the language of this proof is an equality of discrete logarithms). The language of this proof is see Figure 4, Step (1d)
Step of Computation (1e). At this point, each user is able rst to compute h α P s i by multiplying all the h i together, and then, by division of γ (1) n by that value, obtain g α P pw i = ζ n+1 . Then, for i = n, . . . , 2, sequentially, user P i computes ζ i = (ζ i+1 ) 1/α i , along with a SSNIZK proof that the α i is the same as before. This is a proof of discrete logarithm equality, whose language is see Figure 4 ,
Step (1e)
Each player thus sequentially publishes ζ i and the proof, allowing the remaining users to proceed. This backward round of unblinding removes the blinding α in the reverse order it was applied.
• Last
Step of Computation (1f ).
The last player to take part in the unblinding is the group leader P 1 , who is thus the rst to obtain the nal unblinded public key ζ 1 = (ζ 2 ) 1/α 1 = g P pw i = pk.
To communicate the key to the others, the group leader publishes ζ 1 and the related SSNIZK proof.
All the users can then perform the nal unblinding step for themselves and be certain that the resulting key corresponds to the initial password commitments.
Details of the Distributed Decryption realizing F pwDistPrivateComp ( Figure 5 ).
• Common Verification of the Public Key (2a) − (2f ).
These steps are almost the same as in the former protocol, except for (2b) that diers from (1b) for the label that not only contains H, but also the public key pk and the ciphertext c:
This extended label will make sure that all the players use the same data. We also anticipate the goal of this functionality: the computation of c sk . Each user P i also commits to pw i in base c, sending
i ) = (c pw i h t i , g t i ), together with a SSNIZK proof that the same password pw i is committed in both C i and A i , with dierent bases, g and c respectively. This proof is a bit more intricate, but it consists of several proofs of equalities of discrete logarithms:
we rst compute and publish the following elements, for a random u i R ← Z * q :
and also publish SSNIZK proofs that:
i , d i ) the same π i is used to compute G i and Γ i , from g and c respectively:
If one of the proofs received by a user is incorrect, this user aborts the game. Otherwise, since they share the values H and C i , every user is able to compute γ 0 = g P pw i h P s i , h) by multiplying the rst parts of the commitments C i to each other. The group leader P 1 wants to check whether g P pw i = pk. This is done by two blinding and unblinding rings and their associated SSNIZK proofs, exactly as in the computation step of the former protocol: at the end, the group leader does publish ζ 1 = g P pw i (along with the corresponding proof ) and every player is able to check whether the result is correct or not.
• Leader Computation using the Virtual Private Key (3a) − (3d). We now start the computation of c sk in the same manner as g sk , doing two blinding and unblinding rings (using random t i instead of s i and random values β i dierent from α i ) and their supporting sequences of SSNIZK. This time, the users use the commitments in base c, namely the A i , and so in the end the group leader obtains c P pw i but does not publish it. Since the group leader starts the computation and does not publish the nal result c P pw i , it is the only one to learn the message obtained (and even the only one aware that the decryption succeeded, although that information might be dicult to conceal in a real-world application).
Note that in the real-world protocol, a player is compromised if the adversary A guessed a compatible password in the rst ow. Because of the SSNIZK proofs, in this case the adversary is the only one able to send the next ows in an acceptable way.
The proofs of these theorems can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 Let F pwDistPublicKeyGen be the concurrent multi-session extension of F pwDistPublicKeyGen . The distributed key generation protocol in Figure 4 securely realizes F pwDistPublicKeyGen for ElGamal key generation, in the CRS model, in the presence of static adversaries, provided that DDH is infeasible in G, H is collision-resistant, and SSNIZK proofs for the CDH language exist.
Theorem 2 Let F pwDistPrivateComp be the concurrent multi-session extension of F pwDistPrivateComp . The distributed decryption protocol in Figure 5 securely realizes F pwDistPrivateComp for ElGamal decryption, in the CRS model, in the presence of static adversaries, provided that DDH is infeasible in G, H is collisionresistant, and SSNIZK proofs for the CDH language exist.
As stated above, our protocol is only proven secure against static adversaries. Unlike adaptive ones, static adversaries are only allowed to corrupt protocol participants prior to the beginning of the protocol execution.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, we have brought together ideas from secret sharing, threshold cryptography, passwordbased protocols, and multi-party computation, to devise a practical approach to (distributed) passwordbased public-key cryptography. For a given cryptosystem, the objective was to dene, from a set of userselected weak passwords held in dierent locations, a virtual private key that is as strong and resistant to attacks as any regular key, and that can be used in a distributed manner without ever requiring its actual reconstitution.
We proposed general denitions of such functionalities in the UC model, carefully justifying all our design choices along the way. In particular, we saw that it is mandatory to require the presence of a group leader who directs the private computation process and solely obtains its end result. We then constructed explicit protocols for the simple but instructive case of ElGamal encryption. Specically, relying on the DDH assumption, we constructed and proved the security of two ElGamal key generation and decryption protocols, whose private key is virtual and implied by a distributed collection of arbitrary passwords.
To conclude, we now argue that the approach outlined in this paper is in fact quite general and has broad applications. It can of course be viewed as a restriction of the Unauthenticated MPC framework of [1] ; but this would be missing the point, since as often in the UC model, much (or most) of the work has been done once the functionality denitions have been laid down. The functionalities that we have carefully crafted here should apply essentially without change to most kinds of public-key primitives.
The protocols also generalize easily beyond ElGamal decryption. The same method that let us compute c sk from a distributed sk = pw 1 , . . . , pw n , can also compute pairs of vectors (c sk i , c r j ) for a random ephemeral r contributed by all the players or, precisely, for r = i r i where each r i is initially committed to by each player, in a similar way as they initially commit to their passwords. By the hiding and binding properties of the commitments this guarantees that r is uniform and unpredictable if at least one player draws r i at random.
Remarkably, this is enough to let us do password-based distributed IBE, where the private-key generator is decentralized over a set of users, each of them holding only a short private password of their own choosing. PrivateComp is now a key extraction function that maps user identities id to user decryption keys d id . To get: Password-based Boneh-Franklin (BF) IBE [9] , we need to compute d id = H(id) sk where H(id) is a public hash of a user's identity. This is analogous to c sk , and thus our protocol works virtually unchanged. To get: Password-based Boneh-Boyen (BB 1 ) IBE [7] , here d id is randomized and of the form (g sk
. This ts the general form of what we can compute by adding ephemerals to our protocol as just discussed.
Note that in some bilinear groups the DDH problem is easy: in those groups, we must replace DDHbased commitments with ones based on a weaker assumption, such as D-Linear [8] ; such changes are straightforward.
A The UC Framework
The aim of the UC security model is to ensure that UC-secure protocols will continue to behave in the ideal way even if executed in arbitrary environments. This model relies on the indistinguishability between two worlds, the ideal world and the real world. In the ideal world, the security is provided by an ideal functionality F.
One can think of it as a trusted party in the context of multi-party computation: this functionality interacts with n users having to compute a function f . These users give their inputs to F, which gives them back their outputs. We stress that there is no communication between the users. F ensures that the computation is correct and that the users learn nothing more than their own inputs and outputs. Security is then guaranteed since an adversary A can only learn and thus modify the data of corrupted users. In order to prove that a protocol Π veries F, one considers an environment Z that provides inputs to the users and acts as a distinguisher between the real world (with actual users and a real adversary that can control some of them and also the communication among them) and the ideal world (with dummy users interacting only with the ideal functionality F, and a simulated adversary also interacting with F).
We then say that the protocol Π realizes F if for all polynomial adversary A, there exists a polynomial simulator S such that no polynomial environment Z can distinguish between the two worlds (one with F and S, the other with Π and A) with a signicant advantage.
Since there are several copies of a functionality F running in parallel, each one has a unique session identier sid. All the messages must contain the SID of the copy they are intended for. As in [14] , we assume for simplicity that each protocol realizing F has inputs containing its SID. We also assume that each user starts a session by specifying the SID of F, its identity P i , its password pw i , and the identities of the other users P id.
A shortcoming of the UC theorem is that is says nothing about protocols sharing state and randomness (it ensures the security of a single unit only). Here, since we need a common reference string for all instances of the protocol, we need a stronger result, provided by Canetti and Rabin in [15] and called universal composability with joint state. Informally, they dene the multi-session extension F of F, which basically runs multiple instances of F, where each of them is identied by a sub-session identier ssid. F has to be executed with sid and ssid. When it receives a message m containing ssid, it hands m to the copy of F having the SSID ssid (or invokes a new one if such copy does not exist).
For the sake of generality, we shall describe all the functionalities in the context of adaptive adversaries, that are allowed to corrupt users whenever they like to. For simplicity, however, we shall only prove the security of our constructions in presence of static adversaries, that have to choose which users to corrupt before the beginning of the execution of the protocol, either implicitly in the key generation protocol (when the adversary starts playing as one of the parties, choosing by himself the password), or explicitly in the decryption protocol (asking a corruption before a new decryption session).
In the UC model, a corruption implies a complete access to the internal memory of the users (which here means the password and the internal state); in addition, the adversary takes the entire control of the corrupted user, and can modify its behavior for the remaining of the protocol.
B
Proof of the Security Theorems
In this section we give a sketch of the proof that the protocols described on Figures 4 and 5 respectively realize the functionalities specied on Figures 2 and 3 .
The proof of the distributed key generation protocol is similar to that of the distributed decryption given below, with the added simplication that there is no verication step and the dierence that all the users receive the result in the end (which corresponds exactly to what happens in the decryption protocol at the end of the verication step, where everyone also receives the result). Thus, we refer to the proof of the second protocol for the workings of the simulation. The additional simplication implied by the adversary receiving the result in the end will be given in remarks.
B.1 Sketch of the Proof.
The objective of the proof is to construct, from a real-world adversary A, an ideal-world simulator S, so that the behavior of A in the real world and that of S in the ideal world are indistinguishable to the environment. The ideal functionalities are specied in Figures 2 and 3 and described in Section 2. Since we use the joint state version of the UC theorem, we implicitly consider the multi-session extension of this functionality, and thus replace all sid by (sid, ssid). Note that the passwords of the users depend on the sub-session considered. For sake of simplicity, we denote them by pw i , but one should implicitly understand pw i,ssid .
In the real game, we know that the protocol cannot continue past the two initial commitment rounds if there is any inconsistency (between the passwords pw i used in all the commitments, and between the copies of pk and c held by all the users). Any inconsistency will violate the SSNIZK language L, and because the proof system with honest setup is assumed to be sound, it is not feasible for anyone to prove a false statement. Similarly, the two rounds of blinding and unblinding serve to verify the consistency of pk with the pw i 's, and to compute the nal output c sk , respectively. To be precise, the security of these rounds follows from our assumptions: cheating in the computation of the blinding/unblinding rounds without getting caught requires a SSNIZK proof forgery; while distinguishing the nal decryption c sk from random by anyone other than the group leader is reducible to solving the DDH problem in G.
B.2 Description of the simulator.
This description is based on that of [14] . When initialized with security parameter k, the simulator rst chooses a random element h = g x ∈ G, and uses the zero-knowledge simulator to obtain its CRS γ. He nally initializes the real-world adversary A, giving him (h, γ) as common reference string. From this moment on, S interacts with the environment Z, the functionality F pwDistPrivateComp and his subroutine A. For the most part, this interaction is implemented by S just choosing a dummy password and following the protocol on behalf of all the honest players. In addition, instead of following the honest prover strategy, S uses the zero-knowledge simulator in all the proofs (which is indistinguishable due to the zero-knowledge property of the proof protocol). If a session aborts or terminates, then S reports it to A.
Recall that we use the model of split functionalities described in [1] and that the users are partitioned in disjoint sessions according to what they received in the rst ow. This means that, in the following, we can assume that all the players have received the same values of C i,j . This is particularly useful when A controls a set of users since these commitments are extractable. Indeed, note that choosing g and h allows S to know the discrete logarithm x of h in base g. Since the commitments are ElGamal ciphertexts, knowledge of log g h will allow the simulator to decrypt the ciphertexts and then extract the passwords used by A in the rst-round commitments. (The actual extraction requires taking discrete logarithms, but this can be done eciently using generic methods, because the discrete logarithms to extract are the L-bit password sub-blocks which by design have a very small domain. And the small size is enforced by a SSNIZK .) Once these passwords recovered, S asks a testPwd query. If it returns correct, it provides the following equation:
More details on the simulations of the dierent ows follow. Note that if anything goes wrong or S receives a message formatted dierently from what is expected by the session, then S aborts that session and noties A.
Session Initialization. When receiving a message (ssid, P id, P i , pk, c, role) from F pwDistPrivateComp , the simulator S starts simulating a new session of the protocol for party P i , group P id, session identier ssid, and common reference string (h = g x , γ). We denote this session by (P i , ssid).
Step (1a).
S chooses at random n h dummy passwords on behalf of each of the n h honest players, computes the rst-round commitments, and sends them along with the corresponding (and simulated)
proofs. Since the rst-round commitment is computationally hiding under the DDH assumption, this is indistinguishable from a real execution. S then learns from the functionality whether the users all share the same c and pk or not. In the second case, S aborts the game.
Step (1b). If all users are honest, S asks a Private Computation query along with a Leader Decryption Delivery query to the functionality, which returns either complete or error. If it returns complete, then S keeps on using the n h − 1 last dummy passwords, but sets the value g pw 1 of the group leader P 1 such that it is compatible with the value pk = g sk (without knowing the corresponding password): The computation will be correct. S then sends the second-round commitments, along with the corresponding (and simulated) proofs. Note that the password used for the group leader will not be compatible with c sk but this does not matter since it will never be disclosed and will not make the protocol fail. Also note that, since C 1 and C 1 will not be compatible, S will have to prove a false statement for P 1 , which is indistinguishable from a real execution since the proofs are simulated.
Remark.
Note that for the distributed key generation protocol, things would have been simpler. In this case, the simulator not only receives complete or error, but the exact value of pk = g sk . He is thus able to modify g pw 1 such that the passwords are compatible with the public key. Same thing will apply below.
If the query returns error, then the simulator keeps on using the dummy passwords (there is no need that they should be compatible) and sends the new commitments along with the corresponding (simulated)
proofs.
If some users are corrupted, S extracts the passwords and asks a testPwd query. If it is correct, S keeps the n h − 1 rst dummy passwords and changes the last value g pw in h to be compatible with Equation (1) (without knowing the corresponding password). In the same round, S must also produce another series of password commitments, this time as ElGamal encryptions of c pw i and not g pw i . We now have to consider two cases. First, if the group leader is attacked, S computes the commitments normally for the rst n h − 1 honest players using the simulated passwords. For the last player P in h , he asks a Private Computation query along with a Leader Computation Delivery query in order to recover c sk , and computes the missing commitment as an ElGamal encryption of c pw in h , which is given by c pw in h = c sk c
Otherwise, if the group leader is not attacked, the simulator will not recover c sk . We thus proceed as in the honest case, using an incorrect value c pw 1 for the group leader.
Finally, if the testPwd query returns incorrect, since the verication step will fail, S can keep all the dummy passwords (in base g as in base c), and send these commitments along with the corresponding (simulated) proofs.
The indistinguishability between the simulation of this step and the real execution relies on the nonmalleability and the computationally hiding property of the commitment (relying in the DDH assumption).
The adversary cannot become aware that the passwords are not the good ones, or that the password for the user P 1 or P in h changed between the two rounds of commitments.
Following Steps. At this stage, everything is set. If the users are honest and share compatible passwords, then S continues honestly the protocol, by choosing random values α i and β i and executing the four rings as described in the protocol. Recall that the very last step will fail, without any consequence on the nal result, and only in the view of the group leader. S nally asks a Leader Computation Delivery query, setting the bit b to 1 if the execution succeeded and to 0 otherwise (for instance if some ows were non oracle-generated).
If there are some corrupted players, sharing compatible passwords with the rest of the group, S also continues the game honestly with the four rings. Everything goes well if the group leader is attacked.
Otherwise, the last step fails, without any bad consequence since the group leader ends the ring (as before). The bit b is chosen as described above: If something goes wrong and the protocol halts, then b = 0, otherwise b = 1. Remark. Incidentally, what makes the proofs easier in our new paradigm than in key exchange protocols, is that at the end it is not needed to make sure that all the participants obtain the same key in the real world if and only if they do in the ideal world. In our setting, we only need to worry about the key received by a single party: the group leader.
This establishes that, given any adversary A that attacks the protocol Π in the real world, we can build a simulator S that interacts with the functionality F in the ideal world, in such a way that the environment cannot distinguish which world it is in.
B.3 Details of the Proof.
In this proof, we incrementally dene a sequence of games starting from the one describing a real execution of the protocol and ending up with game G 7 which we prove to be indistinguishable with respect to the ideal experiment.
The objective of the proof is to construct from an adversary A a simulator S in the ideal world, so that the behavior of A in the real world and that of S in the ideal world are indistinguishable to the environment. S is incrementally dened in the games, ending up to be completely dened in G 7 (though we do not rewrite him entirely in this game since his behavior was described in the previous games). This nal game will then be proven to be indistinguishable to the ideal world, showing that we indeed have constructed an ideal simulator to the real-world adversary A.
In the rst games, the simulator has actually access to all the information given to the users by the environment, in particular their passwords. In the last game, we nearly are in the ideal game so that the users do not exist anymore: S only has access to the information transmitted by his queries to the functionality (not to the passwords, for instance) and he has to simulate the users entirely by himself.
Between these two situations, the simulator lives in a world which is not really real, not really ideal.
In order to formally model this situation, we chose to consider three hybrid queries that S can ask to the functionality all along the games. The CompatiblePwd query checks whether the passwords of the users are compatible with the passwords of the other users and the public key of the group leader. The Computation query gives back the message obtained by decrypting the ciphertext. And the Delivery query gives the result to the group leaderand to the adversary if the former is compromised.
Note that since in the rst games, the simulator has access to the users' inputs, he knows their passwords. In such a case a CompatiblePwd query (or a Computation or Delivery query) can be easily implemented by letting the simulator look at the passwords owned by the users. When the users are entirely simulated, without the knowledge of their passwords, S will replace the queries above with the real testPwd, Decryption Computation and Leader Decryption Delivery queries to the functionality.
We say that a ow is oracle-generated if it was sent by an honest user and arrives without any alteration to the user it was meant to. We say it is non-oracle-generated otherwise, that is either if it was sent by an honest user and modied by the adversary, or if it was sent by a corrupted user or a user impersonated by the adversary (more generally denoted by attacked user, that is, a user whose password is known to the adversary).
Game G 0 : Real game.
In this game, we know that the protocol cannot continue past the two initial commitment rounds if there is any inconsistency (between the passwords pw i used in all the commitments, and between the copies of pk and c held by all the users). Any inconsistency will violate the SSNIZK language L, and because the proof system with honest setup is assumed to be sound, it is not feasible for anyone to prove a false statement.
Similarly, the two rounds of blinding and unblinding serve to verify the consistency of pk with the pw i 's, and to compute the nal decryption c sk of c, respectively. To be precise, the security of these rounds follows from our assumptions: cheating in the computation of the blinding/unblinding rounds without getting caught requires a SSNIZK proof forgery; while distinguishing the nal decryption c sk from random by anyone other than the group leader is reducible to solving the DDH problem in G.
Game G 1 : Simulation of the SSNIZK proofs.
From this game on, we allow the simulator to program (once and for all) the common reference string (h = g x , γ), where γ is a common reference string for the SSNIZK proofs, and h for the commitment (and x the extraction key).
Additionally, this game modies how the zero-knowledge proofs are performed. Specically, instead of using the honest-prover strategy, all the proofs in which the prover is an honest user are simulated using the zero-knowledge simulator. (Note that the common reference string γ is also simulated once for all.)
Since the proofs are concurrent zero-knowledge, the environment cannot distinguish between the two games G 1 and G 0 . That is, if an environment could distinguish between these hybrids, one could construct an adversary that breaks the zero-knowledge property of the proof protocol.
Game G 2 : Simulation of the rst round of commitments.
From this game on, S simulates the rst rounds of commitments in the following way. We suppose that he still knows the passwords of the players. Let be the number of honest users, i.e. the users S has to simulate. S chooses at random dummy passwords pw i 1 , . . . , pw i on behalf of each one of these users. Once all these values are set, S computes the rst-round commitments and send them to everybody.
S then learns from the functionality whether the users all share the same c and pk or not. In the second case, S aborts the game. In the rst case, S goes on the execution of the protocol in a honest way, using the real passwords of the users. Note that he will have to prove false statements, which is not a problem since the proofs are simulated since the former game. In the end, if the execution succeeds, he asks a Computation query, and he nally sets the bit b to 1 in the Delivery query. Otherwise, if the execution fails, he also asks a Computation query but sets the bit b to 0 for the delivery.
Since the rst-round commitment is hiding, the adversary cannot become aware of the transformation of pw i into pw i : this game is indistinguishable from G 1 . Game G 3 : Simulation of honest users with compatible passwords.
From this game on, we show how to simulate the users without using their passwords. More precisely, the simulator is still supposed to know the passwords of the users, but little by little we are going to show that he actually never needs them in the simulation. This will ensure in the end that the simulator does not need the knowledge of the passwords in order to perform the simulation honestly.
Note that from this game on, we can suppose that all the c and the pk are identical, since the case of dierent values has been dealt with in the former game (and the simulator aborts the protocol in this case). The rst round of commitments is simulated as in G 2 . We now face two cases.
First, if there are attacked users among the group, the simulation continues as in the former game, S being allowed to use the passwords of all the users. (We show in G 5 and G 6 how to simulate in this case without using the passwords.) Second, if all users are honest, we show how to continue the simulation without the help of the passwords. Note that if at some point some ows are non-oracle-generated, the protocol will abort: In this case, the simulator will set the bit b to 0 in the Delivery query. This comes from the non-malleability of the SSNIZK proofs. If the adversary has not generated the rst commitments, he will not be able to construct valid proofs, with unknown witnesses.
The simulator rst asks a Computation query along with a Delivery query to the functionality, which gives him either complete or error. In the second case, S continues the simulation as in the former game, and we allow him to use the passwords of the users (we show in G 4 how to get rid of the use of the passwords in this case).
We now consider the rst case and sum up briey the circumstances which led us here: The users are honest, they have the same c and pk, and their passwords are compatible with the public key. Then, S keeps on using the passwords pw 2 , . . . , pw n for the n − 1 last users, and he is able to set g f pw 1 (without knowing pw 1 ) such that all the passwords are compatible with the value g sk , using the equation: g P f
he still uses c f pw 1 for the last commitment, since he does not know c sk . Notice that he will give once again a proof for a false statement. The simulator then continues honestly the game, by choosing random values α i and β i and executing the four rings as described in the protocol. Only the very last step will fail, since the last value c f pw 1 is incompatible with the other ones. But this does not matter because this value is never sent or used in the remaining of the protocol. In the Delivery query, the bit b is chosen as described in G 2 . Finally note that the simulator never needed the knowledge of the passwords of the users.
Due to the non-malleability of the commitments, along with their hiding property, this game is indistinguishable from G 2 .
Note that for the distributed key generation protocol, things would have been simpler. In this case, the simulator not only receives complete or error, but the exact value of pk = g sk . He is thus able to modify pw 1 such that the passwords are compatible with the public key. Same thing will apply to G 5 .
Game G 4 : Simulation of honest users with incompatible passwords. This game starts exactly as in G 3 . If there are attacked users, the simulator is granted the right to use the passwords of all the users, and continues as in G 2 .
If all the users are honest, he continues as in G 3 , by asking a Computation query. We showed in G 3 how to deal with the case where the functionality returns correct (that is, when the passwords are compatible with the public key) without using the passwords of the users. We now consider the other case and show how to treat it. Thus, we suppose that the Computation query returns an error, meaning that the passwords are incompatible with the public key.
The simulator then computes commitments of the values g f pw i and c f pw i for all the users (there is no need that their passwords should be compatible). He sends them along with the corresponding proofs to the other users. The simulator then continues honestly the game, by choosing random values α i and β i and executing the two rst rings as described in the protocol. Note that the real passwords of the users are not needed anymore. Since the protocol will fail at the verication step, the simulator will set the bit b to 0 in the Delivery query. Since the commitments are hiding, this game is indistinguishable from G 3 .
Game G 5 : Simulation in case of compatible passwords in presence of an adversary. This game starts exactly as in G 2 . The case where all the users are honest has been dealt with in the games G 3 and G 4 . We now consider the case in which the adversary controls a set of users. He can either know their passwords (corrupted users) or not (compromised users). Recall that we denote by the number of honest users.
Note that choosing g and h allows S to know the discrete logarithm of h in base g. Since the commitments are ElGamal ciphertexts, knowledge of log g h will allow the simulator to decrypt the ciphertexts and then extract the passwords used by A in the rst-round commitments. (The actual extraction requires taking discrete logarithms, but this can be done eciently using generic methods, because the discrete logarithms to extract are the L-bit password sub-blocks which by design have a very small domain. And the small size is enforced by a SSNIZK.) After this rst round, the simulator thus extracts the passwords used by the adversary in the commitments he sent. Note that the honest users are not supposed to have received the same values from the adversary: We only know that these values are non-oracle-generated, but not necessarily equal. Thus, the simulator chooses at random one of the commitments received from an attacked user to extract and recover its password. One could argue that there is a problem here, but note that the proof given with the second commitment will fail if the label H is not the same for all users (recall that we have assumed a collision-resistant hash function for the computation of H).
Once S has recovered all the passwords of the attacked users, he asks a CompatiblePwd query. If this query returns incorrect, we continue the simulation as in G 2 (we show in G 6 how to deal with this case without using the passwords of the users).
We now suppose that the query returns correct. This provides the following equation:
Recall that the passwords of the honest users were chosen at random, so there is no chance that they should be compatible with the (common) public key. S thus keeps its − 1 rst passwords and computes a replacement value g f pw i thanks to the above equation. Remark that he does not know the corresponding password pw i .
In the second round, the simulator must produce commitments that are compatible with the public key. To do so, he makes commitments on the same random passwords as before for the − 1 rst honest users, and for the last one creates a commitment as an ElGamal encryption of g f pw i . He sends them all out. In the same round, the simulator must also produce another series of password commitments, this time as ElGamal encryptions of c pw i and not g pw i .
We now have to consider two cases. First, suppose that the group leader is attacked. The simulator computes the commitments normally for the rst − 1 honest players using the simulated passwords. For the last player P i , he asks a Computation query along with a Delivery query in order to recover c sk , and computes the missing commitment as an ElGamal encryption of c f pw i , which is given by c f pw = c sk c
Otherwise, if the group leader is not attacked, the simulator will not recover c sk . We thus proceed as in G 3 , using an incorrect value c pw i j for the group leader (if i j is its index among the uncorrupted players).
S sends out the commitments along with the proofs of consistency. Note that in the second case he will prove a false statement for the group leader.
The simulator then continues the game honestly, by choosing random values α i and β i and executing the four rings as described in the protocol. Everything goes well if the group leader is attacked. Otherwise, the last step fails, without any bad consequence on the protocol since the group leader ends the ring (as in G 3 ). The bit b is chosen as described in G 2 : if something goes wrong and the protocol halts, then b = 0, otherwise b = 1.
Since the commitments are computationally hiding under the DDH assumption, the adversary cannot become aware that the passwords are not the good ones, or that the password for the user P i changed between the two rounds of commitments. This game is indistinguishable from G 4 .
Game G 6 : Simulation in case of incompatible passwords in presence of an adversary. This game starts exactly as in G 5 . We now suppose that the CompatiblePwd query returns incorrect. Since the verication step will fail, S can keep all the values pw i 1 , . . . , pw i for the second round of commitments (in base g as in base c). He then sends these commitments along with the corresponding proofs.
He then continues honestly the protocol (without knowing the real passwords of the users) until it fails, at the verication step. The simulator then asks a Computation query, and a Delivery query with bit b = 0. For the same reasons than in the former game, G 6 is indistinguishable from G 5 . Game G 7 : Indistinguishability with the ideal world.
We have shown that S is able in any case to simulate the whole protocol without using the passwords of the users. Thus, we can now suppose that he does not know these passwords.
The only dierence between G 6 and G 7 is that the CompatiblePwd query is replaced by a testPwd query to the functionality, the Computation by a Decryption query and the Delivery by a Leader Decryption Delivery query. If a session aborts or terminates, S reports it to A. If a session terminates with a message m, then S makes a Delivery call to the functionality, specifying a bit b = 1. If the protocol fails, he gives a bit b = 0. We now show that this last game G 7 is indistinguishable from the ideal-world experiment IWE. More precisely, we have to show that the group leader receives a correct message in G 7 if and only if it receives a correct message in the ideal world.
First, if the users share compatible passwords, the same public key, the same ciphertext, and all the ows are oracle-generated until the end of the game, then the group leader will obtain a correct message, both in G 7 (from G 3 ) and the ideal world, as there are no testPwd queries and the sessions remain fresh.
Second, if they share compatible passwords, the same public key, the same ciphertext, and if there are some impersonation attempts but the adversary plays honestly, then the group leader will also receive a correct message (from G 5 ). Third, if they do not share compatible passwords or if some received ows dier from one user to an other, then the group leader will get an error.
C
Simulation-Sound Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We briey review how we can eciently build our SSNIZK proofs in the random oracle model [4] . Note that we only need to prove two kinds of languages:
equality of discrete logarithms, that is, for a tuple (g, h, G, H) ∈ G 4 , one wants to prove that CDH(g, G, h, H), knowing k such that G = g k and H = h k ;
ElGamal encryption of 0 or 1, that is an OR-proof of equality of discrete logarithms. Given a tuple (g, h, G, H) ∈ G 4 , one indeed wants to prove that CDH(g, G, h, H) or CDH(g, G, h, H/g), knowing k such that G = g k and H = h k (for an encryption of 0) or H = gh k (encryption of 1).
We will also allow a label to be included in the proof, and in the verication.
C.1 Equality of Discrete Logarithms
Given (g, h, G = g k , H = h k ), one rst chooses r R ← Z * q , and computes G = g r and H = h r ; one then generates the challenge c = H( , g, h, G, H, G , H ) ∈ Z q ; one nally computes s = r − kc mod q;
The proof consists of the tuple (c, s). In order to verify the proof, one rst computes the expected values for G and H respectively: G = g s G c and H = h s H c ; and then checks that c ? = H ( , g, h, G 
, H, G , H ).
This proof is a SSNIZK proof [21] , in the random oracle model.
C.2 ElGamal Encryption of 0 or 1
We now want to combine two of the proofs above, in order to show that one of them is true: given (g, h, G, H), we want to show that there exists k such that G = g k and either H = h k or H = gh k . Let us assume that H = g b h k , for b ∈ {0, 1}.
one rst chooses r b R ← Z q and computes G b = g r b and H b = h r b ; one also chooses cb, sb ∈ Z q , and computes G b = g sb G cb , as well as H b = h sb (H/gb) cb ; one then generates the challenge c = H ( , g, h, G, H, G 0 , H 0 , G 1 , H 1 ( , g, h, G, H, G 0 , H 0 , G 1 , H 1 ) .
